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of evolving humanity—are conducive to a higher life, and are for this reason obligatory. And, in the second place, where it leaves us to form empirical judgments, it brings into view those general truths by which our empirical judgments should be guided—indicates the limits within which they must fall.

“Beyond serving to reinforce the injunctions of Beneficence by adding to the empirical sanction a rational sanction, the contents of Parts V. and VI. have these claims to attention:—First, that under each head there are definitely set down the various requirements and restraints which should be taken into account: so aiding the formation of balanced judgments. Second, that by this methodic treatment there is given a certain coherence to the confused and often inconsistent ideas on the subject of Beneficence, which are at present lying all abroad. And third, that the coherent body of doctrine which results, is made to include regulation of sundry kinds of conduct which are not taken cognizance of by Ethics as ordinarily conceived.”

It will be observed that Mr. Spencer no longer admits, as frankly as he seemed to do in the first issue, that the concluding portions of his book are unsatisfactory. The general judgment, however, expressed in the review of his second volume which appeared in the October number of this JOURNAL, still seems to me to be substantially just.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. Seven Essays by Miss Jane Addams, Robert A. Woods, Father J. O. S. Huntington, Professor Franklin H. Giddings, and Bernard Bosanquet. Delivered before the School of Applied Ethics, at Plymouth, Massachusetts, during the session of 1892. With Introduction by Professor Henry C. Adams. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company. Pp. xi, 268.

Not only are these seven essays all admirably written, but in each, except the last, its author has given us a part of his best life and thought; and even in the last, if this be not the case, the theme alone is to blame. Mr. Bosanquet could not but find the methods of the London Charity Organization Society, however scientific and just, too narrow and thin a material for him to expend his best energy upon, and with excellent taste he does not attempt to make more of his subject than it deserves. He perhaps adds nothing to

what has already been said for charity organization principles and methods, but he believes so thoroughly in them that he reiterates them without fatigue to himself or to the reader. One is pleased to learn from him, also, that the principle of charity organization work is "faith in the ideal,"—"only it must be faith in that ideal which is the essence and controlling force of the real; not in fancies and sentiments which are simply a failure to cope with reality." One is pleased to learn this. But perhaps Mr. Bosanquet might have made it clearer how this faith manifests itself in the methods he so painstakingly describes, for those of us who are familiar, as Father Huntington and the president of the New York Charity Organization Society are, with the ghoulish glee aroused in many Charity Organization Society members by the detection, for its own sake, of fraud, those of us who know how lamentably they fail to procure work for the unemployed or to organize existing charities, have supposed that the radical defect in the Charity Organization Society was lack of any ideal at all,—at least of any social ideal. Undoubtedly, it is pledged to "the essence and controlling force of the real" economic order of modern competitive capitalistic society. But surely Mr. Bosanquet does not mistake this essence for an ideal? He does not mean to teach us that the controlling force of all that is real, however bad and unjust, deserves our allegiance? Again, the faith that Mr. Bosanquet preaches, which believes that "character" in individuals will almost always set them on their feet industrially and secure them a competence, is too naïve and too flattering to the prosperous to be accounted as anything but a failure to cope with reality.

The next to the last essay in the book (on "The Ethics of Social Progress," by Professor Giddings) belongs to that class of writings which challenge us to gratitude, because they provoke us to think. At every step in the logical advance we feel forced for truth's and humanity's sake to stop and protest. The contrast between this essay and the five preceding ones of the volume affords a striking illustration of the difference between abstract reasoning and concrete reasoning, therefore between a false kind of thinking and the only true kind. Professor Giddings would not utter many of his boldest statements were he in the habit of keeping in sight the fulness and manifoldness of individual and social life. Like the older school of economists, he lets fall many factors of the problem for convenience' sake, as if they were inappreciable in value, and then comes to conclusions monstrously untrue. Profes-

sor Giddings lacks natural insight, and he ought, therefore, to supplement his study of books by actual work, such as that by which Miss Addams, Mr. Woods, and Father Huntington have been growing wise. Until years of such activity have mellowed his judgment, he will never be able to see the Christ in every human being, even in "a drunken woman or an idiot child," as Miss Addams does, surely never in tramps, whom he goes out of his way to call "absolutely worthless wretches." Now, not all tramps are wretches, or worthless, and few are absolutely worthless. And when he says that "every tramp within the borders of civilization should be placed under arrest and put to severe enforced labor under public direction," he makes one feel that possibly there are even some professors who should be restrained; for really these sweeping statements in condemnation of whole classes of men are bad and unscientific in this decade, and he who teaches them to the young women and young men of our colleges does harm.

So conspicuous on every page is the absence of any mark of individualized affection for the unfortunate victims of the modern so-called Social Progress, that it is hard to appreciate at their full value the wise, practical conclusions with which Professor Giddings closes his paper. He suggests that we should resist the tendency to competitive activity, forbid competition in the education of children, provide the conditions of country life for children, and cultivate individuality in the consumption of wealth. Again, he advises that international migration should be regulated, that each nation should assume the burden of pauperism caused by its own progress, that society should regulate industries that displace the better man by the inferior—but we have not space to give his complete list of practical measures. These proposals have a value independent of Professor Giddings's theory of social ethics. This theory seems to us unworthy of the conclusions attached to it.

Professor Giddings is an optimistic evolutionist. In his opinion the unseen antagonist in life's fateful game of chess is "always just, patient, and fair." The real evolutions of society seem to him to make for the true end,—the survival of living creatures through a progressive evolution of their intelligence and sympathy. It is well just here to remember that so great a believer in the fact of evolution as Professor Huxley recognizes that ethics sets up standards many times in direct moral opposition to the real results of progressive evolution, and in our opinion not one of the historic changes in industrial life cited by Professor Giddings as illustra-

tions of social progress were really moral advancements, even according to Professor Giddings's own definition. The living creatures who survived did not do so through a progressive evolution of their intelligence *and sympathy*; the latter essential factor in moral progress was lacking. They were survivals through shrewd, selfish struggle, through the degradation of intelligence into an instrument for individual self-preservation. As a result, ethical personalities were less in evidence than before, so that to-day our whole economic structure is but a compromise of intelligent greed.

Nor can we follow this essayist in his deductions from his first law of the cost of progress. He infers that because there can be no social progress except at the price of an absolute increase of suffering, economic prosperity and social justice can never mete out comfort to all, and multitudes of human beings must always be in subjection to individual or corporate masters. To outgrow suffering from hunger and want and to be free industrially would, in his mind, involve the attainment of "finality in a world of change." But surely the cost of progress—an absolute increase of suffering—might still be paid, and yet not in the grosser forms of physical want and slavery. Decentralized socialism might merely substitute, as Professor Giddings thinks, competing communities for competing private organizations, and still the individuals might become free and rise above the liability to starvation.

Miss Addams's two essays breathe in every sentence the spirit of rationalized humanity. Nothing could be more to the credit of the University Settlement movement than that it should allure such persons as Miss Addams. Her sympathy for humble folk is as strong, tender, and comprehensive as George Eliot's. The refuse elements of foreign populations dumped into our cities do not seem such to her. She regrets the vulgarizing process to which our American social progress will subject them. "The Italian and Bohemian peasants who live in Chicago," she tells us, "still put on their bright holiday clothes on a Sunday and go to visit their cousins. They tramp along with at least a suggestion of having once walked over ploughed fields and breathed country air. The second generation of city poor have no holiday clothes and consider their cousins 'a bad lot.' I have heard a drunken man, in a maudlin stage, babble of his good country mother and imagine he was driving the cows home, and I knew that his little son, who laughed loud at him, would be drunk earlier in life, and would have no such pastoral interlude to his ravings." And the serenity with which she urges

upon us the *social* expression of democracy, the sharing of the life of the race and "a certain *renaissance* of Christianity," is as confident and unruffled as the sweet preaching of Emerson.

Her account of Hull House is clear and satisfying. We cannot but regret, however, that the chief glory of Hull House and of its presiding genius, the assistance rendered to four trades-unions for women,—a fact which will bring to the educated classes of America more than anything else ever done by them the confidence of workmen and the respect of labor leaders,—should have been introduced so incidentally and subordinately into Miss Addams's account of her work. And she seems to imply that the reason she has allowed four trades-unions to meet at Hull House (two of which were organized there) is not because she recognizes the moral and social necessity for organizing women into labor-unions. She says, "It seems to me of great importance that as trades-unions of women are being formed, they should be kept, if possible, from falling into the self same pits the men's unions have fallen into." If there had been no danger of pitfalls, would the occasion have fallen away for encouraging these organizations of women? However this may be, it was a plucky thing to do, and perhaps a stroke of moral genius, for the prevailing sentiment of "cultivated Americans" is at the present juncture strongly opposed to trades-unionism.

Mr. Woods's article on "The University Settlement Idea" is full of sound, practical suggestions for any one wishing to enter such work as that of Andover House. But we have here only space for expressing our regret that neither Miss Addams nor Mr. Woods advocates or seems to have thought of the only kind of "a social settlement" which, in our opinion, can ever become a permanent centre of organic reform. Both these writers seem to have in mind only the "educated young persons,"—exceptional individuals who leave their homes and surroundings to live among working-people. But the true and abiding social settlement, that which will succeed and render unnecessary the University Settlement, will be one of educated *families*. Whole families must and will feel "the subjective necessity for social settlements." Four such families in London, from the interest of one or more members of each in the Leighton Hall Neighborhood Guild, have taken up their residence in houses adjoining the guild. We cannot here enlarge upon the advantages of a settlement of families over one of isolated young persons, but they are easy to discover, and it is unfortunate that Miss Addams's and Mr. Woods's pens could not have used their

happy skill to arouse the conscience of American families to their civic duty as families.

In Father Huntington's essays on "Philanthropy: Its Success and Failure" and on "Philanthropy and Morality" the people themselves seem to be speaking, voicing at last their needs, confessing their weaknesses, and rebuking the rich. If Miss Addams sympathizes with the humble, Father Huntington is humble. He also more than the other writers seems to be conscious of the laws of social life and the causes of poverty. But it is a little curious that while charity organization finds in this volume a champion in Mr. Bosanquet, the single-tax theory an advocate in Father Huntington, and trades-unions an indulgent friend in Miss Addams, not one of these writers has a word to say in favor of any form of socialism. Were representatives of socialism not invited to speak at the School of Applied Ethics? Or, among cultivated men in America interested in Philanthropy and Social Progress, is there no one in favor of the municipalization or nationalization of capital as well as of land?

Above all other teachings of this volume the idea of the Social Settlement stands out. But, heartily as we approve of the spirit and methods of settlement work, there is, we think, one other defect in the plea for it set forth in this volume besides its omission of the idea of family settlements. This other defect is the failure to make the centre of reform life spring from a group of the working-people themselves. According to Miss Addams, it is to spring from the residents,—from Hull House. But rather does it seem to us that ultimately the life of the working-people must be organized about a centre of their own, where Miss Addams would be their guest, not they hers.

STANTON COIT.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY. A Metaphysical Essay. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xxiv, 558.

This is a truly great book; and though the discussion of a metaphysical essay does not lie within the scope of the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, yet there are some points in the volume which demand our attention. The part that concerns us is contained chiefly in Chapter XXV., which is entitled "Goodness," but this